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FOREWORD
This report was prepared by W. R. Blackstone, Senior Research
Engineer, at the Structural Research Laboratory of Southwest Research
Institute in San Antonio, Texas. The work was conducted under NASA Con-
tract No. NAS 9-9543 and SwRI Project No. 03-2631, entitled "Development
of an Improved Gaseous Oxygen Impact Test System. "
The work reported occurred June 1969 to May 1970 and was conducted
under the guidance of L. U. Rastrelli, Assistant Director of the Department
of Structural Research of Southwest Research Institute and under the general
supervision of Dr. Robert C. De Hart, Director of that Department. The
study was administered under the auspices of the Manned Spacecraft Center
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration by Mr. Martial Davous',
Contracting Officer. The Technical Monitor was Mr. Herschel M. Jamison.
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ABSTRACT
This report describes consultative services provided by Southwest
Research Institute to the Manned Spacecraft Center in a program to develop
an improved gaseous oxygen impact test system. The services provided
included a critical evaluation of background information derived from related
tests already in used, general consultations with MSC staff in the areas of
material compatibilities with liquid and gaseous oxygen, assistance to the
staff of the White Sands Test Facility in the areas of equipment design and
impact test procedures, and assistance to the MSC Apollo 13 Investigation
Team.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Report Summary
This report summarizes the work performed at Southwest Research
Institute in the period of June 10, 1969 through May 10, 1970, under Con-
tract NAS 9-9543, entitled "Development of an Improved Gaseous Oxygen
Impact Test Systein. " Experimental efforts in this program were conducted
at the Manned Spacecraft Center by NASA personnel; SwRI's role was to
provide consultation services to expedite accomplishment of the program
goals. The services included assistance in planning of the experimental
program, analysis of experimental results, assistance in design and improve-
ment of the experimental equipment, and general consultation in the area of
GOX- and LOX-material compatibility.
B. Background and Scope of Efforts
It is common knowledge that many materials can burn or explode if
subjected to external stimuli in the presence of oxygen. The space industry,
with its widespread use of both liquid and gaseous oxygen, is particularly
concerned with this problem, and much effort has been expended in attempting
to define the degree of hazard associated with the various materials under
various types of external stimuli. Impact is the mode of stimulus which has
perhaps received the most attention, as it is known that impacts can and do
occur in nearly all oxygen environments.
One of the first problem areas to be recognized was that of the severe
mechanical and/or hydraulic impact conditions in liquid oxygen (LOX) systems.
Consequently, much research has gone into the development of LOX impact
test methods to aid in the selection of materials for these systems, and from
this a more or less standardized LOX impact test technique has evolved.
The body of data accumulated to date with this procedure is substantial.
On the other hand, relatively little attention has been paid to the
problem of impact hazard in gaseous oxygen (GOX) systems, and no proven
impact test methods exist in this area. As a result, the designers selecting
GOX system materials have had to rely on the rather indirectly applicable
results of LOX impact tests. Considering only the great physical differences
between LOX and GOX reveals this to be an unsatisfactory situation, but, as
will be seen later, there are also serious questions concerning the meaning-
fulness of LOX impact test data with respect to LOX systems - not to mention
any indirect applications.
In an attempt to alleviate this, the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) is
presently engaged in a program to develop a reliable GOX impact test for
use in selecting materials for the many GOX systems employed in the space
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probrain. This work was initiated early in 1968 in the Thermochemical Test
Branch (TTB) of the MSC with the fabrication of three replicates of the first
generation high-pressure GOX impact test system. This system was aesigned
to operate at pressures tip to 10, 000 psi and consisted essentially of a minia-
turized ABMA-type* drop weight apparatus completely enclosed within a high-
pressure chamber. The purpose of this first-generation system (known as
the E&D tester) was to serve as a vehicle for parametric studies, and suc-
ceeding generations would of course be redesigned to account for vagaries
pinpointed in the initial exploratory testing. It was recognized that the
exploratory tests would be of questionable value with regard to definitive
compatibility ratings of the various materials; such data were to come after
the redesign phase.
It soon became apparent, however, that the need for reliable com-
patibility data was becoming critical. Moreover, the E&D tester has a niaxi-
mum data output rate of only about 9 test drops per day, and this was much
too slow to accommodate the growing demand. As a consequence of theser^	 developments, it was decided to increase the level of effort by going ahead
with two or three alternate tester designs before completing the exploratory
work with the E&D tester. This brought manpower availability into the
picture, and eventually, in mid-1969, led to transfer of the entire experi-
mental effort to the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). With the delays
involved in the transfer and in the program redirection, it was not until
early 1970 that any of the test systems actually became operational.
SwRI's proposal for this work was submitted in June 1968, and the
scope of the proposed efforts was keyed to the program being pursued at
MSC at that time. Contract negotiations, however, were not completed until
June 1969, and at that time the NASA program redirection was being effected.
As a result, some changes in emphasis had to be made with regard to SwRI's
efforts in the program.
The major part of the proposed effort was to have been directed
toward assistance in planning of the experimental program and in analysis of
the experimental results with the goal of a carefully developed and reliable
test procedure. With the combination of SwRI's background in these areas
and MSC's experience with the equipment being developed, it was felt that
this goal could be achieved within one to two years. However, the unantici-
pated equipment transfer resulted in a long delay in the experimental work
togetl:; r with the replacement of the MSC personnel with WSTF personnel
who were relatively inexperienced in impact sensitivity testing. As a result,
the SwRI efforts have consisted mostly of general consultation with the MSC
in the area of GOX- and LOX-material compatibility, and assistance to WSTF
*The ABMA drop weight apparatus will be described in Section II.
in the basic techniques of sensitivity testing and in critical areas of equip-
ment design.
Another aspect which influenced the course of the work was a decision
early in 1970 to postpone the test system evaluation work in order to put the
new equipment to immediate use in "qualifying" materials for the Apollo
program. This decision is still in effect at this writing, and there appear to
be no plans for any system evaluation work before September 1970, as the
systems are fully committed to such work until that time. It is noted that
this particular redirection was opposed by SwRI because of the detrimental
effects a similar approach had in the early development of the LOX impact
test. As will be brought out in detail in later sections, impact test results
are highly system dependent. They usually exhibit a very poor reproducibility
between test systems, even when the differences between the systems are
seemingly minor. It thus stands to reason that the material response obtained
in a test system could easily be different from that in the service system.
Further, the material response is usually categorized as a "go/no- gu" type of
response, i. e. , the material either dies or does not ignite. Considering
all these aspects together, it appears that, even with a carefully developed
test system, there is always some risk that the material which did not ignite
in the test system will do so in the service system. It is felt that these
risks are compounded by "qualifying" materials in a test system which has
not been evaluated as to whether the material responses it predicts are real-
istic with respect to the service system in which the material will be used.
In view of the fact that the materials in question are already in use
and that we obviously need an evaluation as quickly as possible, the above
point may seem a bit trifling at first. Indeed, it would seem that in this
case a small amount of early information would be preferable to waiting out
a possibly lengthy system evaluation. However, if that preliminary test
rates a material as "safe" when in fact it is not, then the user who is not
completely aware of Cle development status of the test may be mislead with
expensive consequences. Moreover, as will be brought out in discussing
the LOX test development, such an approach tends to result in the accumula-
tion of preliminary data on a large number of materials before the test sys-
tem evaluation is started. Then, if the test sy -,tem evaluation is conducted
at all, it will inevitably show that the necessarily arbitrary procedures and
equipment designs for the preliminary data gathering phase are in need of
change. These indicated changes, however, will probably not be made,
because it will then be realized that this would result in the possible negation
of the large amount of data already in hand. The usual result is that the
original test system design is eventually standardized, and those vagaries
that happen to be associated with the original system are perpetuated.
The next section discusses the three investigative areas in which
SwRl provided consultative services during this program. Following these
discussions are the conclusions drawn about program progress in these areas
and r ecommendations concerning the direction of future work.
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II. AREAS OF CONSULTATION
The consultative services provided by SwRI during the course of this
program were:
(1) A critical evaluation of background information available to the
GOX impact test method development for TTB and an assessment
of the expected problem areas.
(2) Technical consultation with WSTF throughout the contract period.
This took the forms of providing; WSTF with a source of back-
ground experience in the problems peculiar to impact sensitivity
research (WSTF personnel had no prior experience in this area),
recommendations on equipment design concepts, recommendations
of appropriate approaches to test system evaluation, and analysis
of the small amount of data generated by the end of the contract
period.
(3) Assistance to Panel 8, High Pressure Oxygen Systems Survey,
MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Team.
Werk accomplished in these areas is described in the following paragraphs.
A.	 Pre-1 ,gram Status of Oxygen Impact Test Develupment
As indicated previously, almost ro work had been done in GOX
impact testing prior to this program. Consequently, not only have LOX
impact test results been the only information available to designers, but,
also, they have formed the only background information for guidance in
developing a GOX impact test. Since the LOX test was developed many
years ago and has produced voluminous amounts of data, it would seem that
there would be no trouble in developing a GOX test along similar lines.
However, it was also mentioned previously that there are still serious
questions concerning the meaning of the data from the test in its most widely
used form. Considering this, it is appropriate to discuss the LOX test
in more detail, followed by an assessment of what little work has been done
recently in GOX.
1.	 The LOX Impact Test
In the late 1950's, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMAy'
devised a drop-weight impact tester and a test method for measuring impact
sensitivity (Ref. 1). Over the years, considerable effort has been expended
*Now Marshall Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration.
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in refinement and standardization of this technique, and these efforts have
resulted in the a -i r-ption of standard impact sensitivity test methods in the
forms of USAF Specification Bulletin 527 (Ref. 2) and NASA Specification
MSFC-SPEC -106B (Ref. 3). Recently, the similar characteristics of these
two methods have been combined in the ASTM Test Method D-2512 (Ref. 4).
All of these test methods employ the same basic d r op -weight type tester
with only minor- variations in test procedures and in the details of handling
the test materials. In all instances, the test material is placed in an
aluminum specimen cu t: in the presence of liquid oxygen, and upon the test
material is placed a stainless steel striker pin. A plummet is released
from a known height, and observations are made as to whether a reaction
'zas or has not taken place. After each test drop, the sample remains are
discarded, and a new sample is positioned for the next drop. In all three
methods, the basic concept used is that of attempting to measure the "chr•';shold
value" of a material by finding the highest drop height at which the material
will withstand 20 consecutive test drops without reaction. The threshold
value thus obtained is used as the relative sensitivity rating for the material.
In the Air Force and NASA methods, a variation of the threshold value
technique is widely used to qualify materials for service. In this variation,
20 or more drops are made from a fixed I-eight of 42 in. (or 43. 3 ill. ), and
the materials are accepted or rejected on i. "go/no-go" basis. Clearly,
for a material that yields no reactions in this test, its threshold value is,
by definition, either 42 in (or 43. 3 in. ) or higher.
Unfortunately, these methods have been plagued from their
inception with rather poor repeatability and reproducibility, as is brought
out in the precision statement (Table 1) published in ASTM Method D-2512.
TABLE 1
PRECISION STATEMENT OF ASTM TEST METHOD D-2512
Threshold value	 Repeatabili ty, one
	 Reproducibility, diff.
drop height	 operator and	 operator and
(in.)	 apparatus in.	 apparatus (in. )
	24	 17.0	 40.8
	
15	 10.6	 25.2
	
6	 4.3	 10. 1
Such figures show that the current test methods do not yield results suffi-
ciently precise for reliable compatibility evaluations. In spite of its long
history of errant behavior, however, this test method remains today as the
primary method by which. materials are chosen for NASA LOX systems.
Insofar as is known, all the LOX impact test facilities in the country, save
one, are set up in adherence to this procedure.
The one test facility set up along different lir.2s is at Southwest
Research Institute. This facility was originally installed under Air Force
contract in the late 1950's, and for some years was operated in accordance
with the Bulletin 527 procedure mentioned previously. Generally, the
research program followed duri,.G this period was similar to those of other
organizations in the field: a systematic investigation of the effects of various
equipme ►it adjustments in an attempt to determine the cause or causes of
the poor precision of the "threshold value" method. In the mid-1960's,
however, both the Institute and the Air Force came to tae conclusion that
the prime source of trouble lay not in the equipment but in the procedure
itself. This conclusion came as, a result of reviewing impact sensitivity
research in the field of condensed phase explosives and liquid monopro-
pcllants. It was learned that these people hadat first followed the "threshold
value" approach, but had long since abandoned this as unworkable from the
standpoint of the statistical theory involved. The much more efficient
replacement method involved measurement of the 50-50 "go/no-go" point,
with fundamental principles of probability mathematics being applied in
determining the S-curve from which to establish this point. Apparently,
LOX impact sensitivity testing had run afoul of the same problem and could
possibly benefit from the same solution. The Institute then set out, with
Air Force approval, to attempt to apply these techniques.
It was only after a considerable period of "trial-and-error"
redesign of the striker pin and specimen cup that the new technique could
be used. Once operational, however, the new technique, which iE known as
the "up-and-down, " or "Bruceton" method, proved to be quite efficient and
very repeatable. Figures 1 and 2 present some typical results for various
liquids and greases, ranging from common hydrocarbons to fluorochemicals.
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In both figures, the highest and lowest ratings are shown for materials
tested two or more times. The encircled letter "P" under the sample code
indicates that the sample has passed the USAF Specification Bulletin 527
test at 42 in. ; similarly, the letter "F" denotes that the sample has failed
that test. Table 2 identifies the test material codes.
It was found that the precision with which sensitivity could be
rated by the up-and-down test was much improved over that of the current
test methods. However, with improved precision, it can also be seen that
the sensitivities of most of these materials are so close together as to
make significant distinction between them difficult. Moreover, just as one
would suspect intuitively (from the types of materials tested), some of
these were very violent reactors while others yielded at worst only small
char marks--no flash, no sound. Clearly, the violent reactors would be
more hazardous in a LOX system than would the mild reactors; yet, this
intuitively obvious difference was not being defined quantitatively by sensi-
tivity measurements alone. This, in turn, made it clear that the degree,
or intensity, of reaction is not only a fundamental part of the full definition
of hazard per se, but in some cases is the only property which can dis-
tinguish unambiguously between "good" and "bad" materials. Significantly,
Brown, et al. , independently and simultaneously arrived at the same con-
clusion with regard to the impact sensitivity testing of solid explosives
(Ref. 5).
Considering the above, the next logical step seemed to be the
development of some means for making quantitative measurements of reaction
intensity during impact tests. The equipment subsequently developed for
this purpose proved quite satisfactory, and the results of an extensive test
program utilizing this apparatus were published in an Air Force Technical
Report (Ref. 6) in December 1967, and in the ASLE Transactions in July
1968. The method also appears in the ASTM Standards, Part 18 (Second
Edition), October 1969.
FABLE 2
TEST MATERIALS
Sample code Sample type 	 Description
D-1071 Liquid lieptacosafluorotributylamine
D-1093 Liquid Silicone
E-1005 Liquid Fluorosilicone
E-1009 Liquid Chlorinated biphenyl
E-1010 Liquid Fluorinated polymers of chlorotri-
fluoroethylene
F-1040 Liquid A fluorochemical, composition un-
known
G-1074 Liquid Silicone
J-1050 Liquid Mineral	 oil,	 NIII,1, 1032,	 Gracie
1100
J-1052 Liquid A fluorochemical, composition un-
known
J-1080 Liquid Pul)-glyoul
K-1081 Liquid Different lot of J-1080
K-IOS2 Liquid Different lot of F,1010
F-1018 Grease MoS, and petroleum base oil
G-1051 Grease Unknown
G-1052 Greasse Unknown
0-1071 Grease Unknown
G-1077 Grease Graphite in fluorocarbon oil
1f-1012 Grease MoSt in fluorocarbon oil
11-1013 Grease Tetrafluoroethylene in fluorocarbon
oil
H-1027 Grease Unknown
11-1032 Grease Chlorinated polymer of chlorutri-
fluoroethylene
11-1040 Grease Graphite in chlorinated biphenyl
H-10y 1 Crease Fluorosilicone
I1-1085 Grease Different lot of 11-1032
J-1012 Grease Graphite and chlorinated biphenyl
J-1022 Grease Silicone
J-1053 Grease Hydrocarbon
J-1074 Grease Different lot of 11-1032
J-11'_'0 Grease Unknown
K-1001 Crease Fluorosilicone
K-1002 Grease Different lot of I1-1032
K-1015 Grease Polymeric	 fluorinated	 oil	 with
PTFE thickener
K-1022 Grease Perfluorotrialkylamitie with YTFE
thickener
None Solid Acetate, clear
None Solid I'henolic, canvas base
None Solid Polyester
None Solid I'olyimide
None Solid YTFE (px)lyt,etrafluoroethylene)
None Solid Vinyl
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Briefly, the reaction intensity measuring system consists of a
probe device which makes a relative measurement of the peak air shock
pressure generated by a reaction. For such test drops, two such devices
are located near the specimen clip at points 180° apart. The standard test
procedure calls for 20 test drops from 43. 3 in. , and i`-his yields a total of
40 peak pressure readings. The highest individual peak pressure reading of
the 40 thus obtained is defined as the maximurn peak pressure and is taken
as the reaction intensity rating of the material under test.
Figure 3 presents the results of 69 different 20-drop reaction
intensity tests on 23 liquids and greases. For each material, the two cir-
cles connected by a line show the range of maximum peak pressures (the
maximum peak pressure is the highest individual peak pressure reading of
the 40 such readings taken in a 20-drop test) obtained in all tests on that
material. For example, one 20-drop test on H-1081 yielded a maximum
peak pressure of 50 psi, another test gave 32 r)si, while the remaining eight
tests yielded maximum peak pressures somewhere between these two values.
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DENOTES THE RANGE OF MAXIMUM PEAK PRES-
SURES MEASURED IN THE APPLICABLE
NUMBER OF TESTS
Before proceeding further with the discussion of these data, it
is felt that some physical frame of reference for the various levels of peak
pressurewould be helpful. First, the maximum peak pressure readings
obtained in two 20-drop tests on "blanks'' (specimen cup with liquid oxygen
but without any sample material) are included in Figure 3. These readings
(0. 2 to 0. 3 psi )amount to background noise--the sound pressure generated by
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the steel-on -steel impact. Second, the readings from about 0.4 to about
2 psi arc those of sounds only very slightly above the background noise.
Toward the lower part of this range, these sounds are practically indis-
tinguishable from the background noise. Toward the upper part, the sounds
are distinct but still very low, and are usually not accompanied by any visible
flash. Third, readings in the neighborhood of 5 to 9 psi are the same as those
produced by "Chinese firecrackers" (approximately 3/16-in. diam. X 1. 5-in.
long) exploded individually in the :specimen cup. Finally, readings of 50 to 70 psi
are the same as those produced by "cherry bombs" (spherical firecrackers
of about 1 . 0-in. diam. ) exploded in the specimen cup.
With this background, the significance of the maximum peak
pressure readings produced by the various materials can be evaluated. Most
noteworthy is the separation of the 23 materials into two distinct groups: one
with high maximum peak pressures and the other with low maximum peak
pressureF . Judging from the physical references discussed, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the 30 to 160 psi reactions are dangerous explosions
and that occurrence of such reactions in an oxidizer system would probably
abort the mission of the system. Furthermore, those materials in Figure 3
that yielded such explosive reactions are obviously capable of doing the same
thing in an oxidizer system if stimulated. Considering this together with
the fact that the impact type of stimulus is very difficult to predict in a
dynamic system, it appears that this group of materials should be classified
as extremely hazardous and excluded from use in oxidizer systems. On the
other hand, the reactions of the other group of materials in Figure 3 in no
instance yielded peak pressures exceeding 1. 2 psi; reactions of this order
are so mild that their occurrence in a system would not appear likely to
cause damage, or even be noticed. Therefore, this group could be classified
as relatively inert.
It should be emphasized that the classifications of extremely
hazardous or relatively inert developed above are based upon a premise
radically different from that of the current test methods. The current test
methods try to determine whether a material does or does not react with
liquid oxygen under impact, with the object of accepting those which do not.
This premise becomes untenable when liquids and greases of almost every
conceivable structure show some type of evidence of reaction at almost
the same stimulus levels. The object of the reaction intensity test, then, is
to identify those materials which do not appear capable of reacting to an
extent which would affect the system. This premise would also be difficult
if one had to specify the exact level of intensity just sufficient to cause system
damage. Fortunately, this problem is avoided in the case of liquids and
greases, since the compatibility differences between the two groups are
large and obvious.
Also notable is the fact that no less than five of the materials
shown to be capable of powerful explosions in Figure 3 have previously passed
the Bulletin 527 test at 42 inches. These are J-1012, H-1081, H-1027,
H-1040, and K-1001. Considering that for the past several years, this test
method and its very similar NASA counterpart, MSFC -SPEC - 106B, have
handled Nearly all the acceptance testing in this area, it is a logical assump-
tion that such hazardous materials may be in service at present.
Another very interesting aspect of material behavior uncovered
by the reaction intensity test involves the material contamination problem.
It has been generally accepted that minute quantities of a contaminant can
render an ordinarily inert material impact sensitive. The data in Table 3,
on the other hand, suggest a somewhat different interpretation.
TA BLE 3
REACTION INTENSITIES OF MIXTURES OF TWO LIQUIDS
Avg. peak Max. peak
Sample press.	 (psi) press.	 (psi)
K- 1082 0. 18 0. 36
90% K - 1082, 10% K - 1081 0.20 0. 54
0.27 0.65
0.21 0.40
0.27 0.65
0.24 0.40
80% K-1082, 20% K-1081 0. 17 0.25
0.25 0. 35
0.24 0. 55
0. 22 0.75
0.48 2.25
700116 K-1082, 30% K-1081 0.49 6.8
0. 18 2. 5
0.23 1.5
0.35 5. 5
1.33 21.0
50% K-1082, 50% K-1081 6. 3 46.0
30% K- 1082, 70% K - 1081 38. 0 100.0
K-1081 48.0 124.0
This table presents the results of reaction intensity tests on various mixtures
of a violently explosive liquid K-1081 and a relatively inert liquid K-1082.
In considering these results, it should be recalled that maximum peak pres-
sures up to about 2.0 psi are exceedingly mild. With this in mind, it can be
seen that a really significant reaction did not occur until the proportion of
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the explosive liquid was inc reared to 20 percent Even then, only one such reaction,
and it was of low order, occurred in five 20-drop tests. Further, it was
necessary to increase the proportion of the explosive liquid to50percent before
highly explosive reactions became evident.
It is apparent that this particular case presented a hazardous
situation only when the amount of explosive material far exceeded what might
be considered a trace contaminant. Now, there is no intended implication
that reasonable efforts to avoid contamination are not needed; rather, it is
emphasized that an explosive reaction obtained with a supposedly inert
material in a test or service situation cannot necessarily be blamed on the
presence of trace contaminants. Indeed, considering the previously dis-
cussed performance of the current test methods, the prime suspect in such
a case should be the supposedly inert material.
Considerably more discussion could be devoted to the problem
areas uncovered during more than ten years of impact testing in LOX. It
is felt, however, that the foregoing provides an adequate picture of the
"state-of-the-art" in this test and of the difficulties that are as yet unre-
solved. It is also worthy of mention at this time that many of these difficulties
are conceptual in nature rather than mechanical, and that we can thus expect
some familiar•
 situations to develop in the GOX program.
2.	 The GOX Impact Test
In contrast to the situation of the LOX test, early experiments
with GOX had the background advantage of a considerable number of ignition
and flammability test procedures already worked out for other similar
environments such as air. A considerable disadvantage, however, was the
fact that GOX tests have to take into account two additional and significant
environmental variables not faced in the LOX test: initial pressure and
initial temperature.
As mentioned previously, very little work has been done in the
	 t
area of impact testing of materials in GOX environments. In fact, outside
of the small amount gathered to date in the subject program, there appears
to be no data at all at pressures greater than 50 psi. Low-pressure data are
also quite limited, with the only significant amount being that gathered in a
recently completed project at Marshall Space Flight Center. The equipment
used for this work was capable of pressures to 50 psi and consisted of the
basic ABMA LOX impact tester along with a modified anvil region assembly.
The test procedure used was essentially that of MSFC-SPEC-10613; namely,
obtaining the reaction frequency in 20 drops of a 20-1b plummet from
43. 3 inches. Considerable data were gathered in this manner, and it was
stated that these data showed a good general correlation with LOX impact
data. From this, it was concluded that the 106E procedure would continue
as MSFC's method for choosing materials for both LOX and GOX service.
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The MSC-WSTF program is of course concerned with systems
operating at considerably higher pressures. Considering this together with
the previously discussed problems with the LOX test, it was concluded that
there was a definite need for high-pressure impact response data that would
j	 not be served by the 106E test.
1
	
	
One attractive feature of the MSFC equipment is the apparent
capability for generating relatively large amounts of data in a short tirlie. If
the current program should indicate that impact test results at high pressures
relate in a predictable manner to those at lower pressures, then this approach
might prove useful for qualification and/or verification test procedures.
B.	 Assistance to the Experimental Program
As mentioned previously, a major reason for the equipment transfer
was to seek a more rapid development program consummation by simultaneous
development of several test system concepts. The E & D test system, of
course, was already in an operational status but it was reasoned that the
alternate concepts could be designed and built while the E & D system was
being transferred. As of this writing, the E & D system transfer had been
completed; however, no further testing had been accomplished, though one
alternate system had been built and used in a limited amount of exploratory
testing. Data from these tests were used for guidance in designing and
building a second alternate system, which was put in operation in April 1970.
A detailed description of these systems would constitute a lengthy
paper in itself. Therefore, we will atempt here to describe only the basic
concepts being pursued. Essentially, the two alternate mechanical impact
test systems under development differ from the E & D test system only in
thati `lie drop-weight apparatus is external to the high-pressure sample
chamber. This of course introduces a pressure sealing problem at the
striker pin together with the question of the additional impact resistance
posed by the sample chamber pressure on the striker pin. Both the alternate
systems attack these problems by utilizing a secondary pressure chamber
around a collar on the upper portion of the striker pin. The secondary
pressure chamber is pressurized with nitrogen, exerting a downward force
on the striker pin that counterbalances the upward force from the oxygen
pressure c hamber. The second alternate system differs from the first
primarily in that it is designed for quick disassembly, which in turn allows
a much improved test output of 5 or more test drops per hr. A more subtle
difference concerns the amount of impact energy used and the manner in
which the sample material is confined; the significance of this will be dis-
cussed later.
At the outset, it wa y decided that SwRI's role in this work would be
to serve as a technical consultant to offset the relative inexperience of the
WSTF staff in the area of impact sensitivity testing. This was effected by
three different trips to WSTF and numerous telephone contacts. The dis-
cussions involved mainly the statistical techniques to be used in developing
the test procedure, and the equipment design features considered necessary
u	 in the light of the probable applicability of the "hot spot" theory of irnpact-
induced ignition.
It might seem at first glance that the evaluation of the new test
systems would be a relatively straightforward procedure, but, unfortunately,
there are a number of well-hidden "pitfalls" here. As an illustration, con-
sider the apparently simple matter of choosing the appropriate impact
energy capabilities for the new systems. It would seem logical to start with
some arbitrary figure such as, say, 70 ft-lb, and then determine whether
this energy level was sufficient to react the various materials already
well known to be reactive (for example, automotive engine oil). If not, then
other energy levels would be tried. Once the appropriate energy level was
found, then materials would be rated as "safe" or "unsafe" in accordance
with their response at this level. Now, as stated previously, this appears
to be a reasonable approach, but the "pitfall" lies in the assumption that a
70 ft-lb impact gives the same order of magnitude of ignition stimulus in
the service system as in the test system. Just how much in error this
assumption can be may be demonstrated in the LOX impact test with any of
several materials. One material, for example, can be made to explode
violently on every trial at 35 ft-lb, or to be inert in every trial at 70 ft-lb,
with the type of response being dependent on the configuration of the striker
pin and specimen cup. Further evidence of this is afforded by preliminary
data from the two alternate GOX test systems. In tests at 10 ft-lb on the
same materials, one system yields significantly greater sensitivity ratings.
The probable reasons for the above may be found by examination of
the generally accepted theory of the impact ignition mechanism. This therr y
holds that impact produces ignition through concentration of energy into ':lot
spots; not through general compression of the bulk sample material Since
much of the total impact energy delivered does, however, go into deforma-
tion of the sample, sample cup, etc . , it follows that only a portion shows
up at a hot spot site as ignition stimulus. From this, it can be seen that
the amount of actual ignition stimulus delivered depends not only upon the
gross impact stimulus applied, but also on how efficiently that stimulus is
localized into hot spots. This, in turn, is a function of test method,
specimen cup, striker pin, compression, state of the substance tested,
and so on. Clearly, then, it can be very dangerous to conclude from an
impact test that a certain material is safe at so many ft-lb of impact--in
the service system, a much smaller energy input might cause ignition
through better localization. In other words.- impact sensitivity is a highly
system-dependent phenomena.
There are of course other problems to be faced in the test system
evaluation, but most are connected to some degree with the system dependence
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aspect. To combat this, considerable attention was paid to the formulation
of an evaluation plan. A general description of this plan, along with the
reasoning involved, is presented in the following paragraphs.
1. Selection of Reference Materials
Tn of der to expedite the evaluat ion procedures, one should initially
use a group of test materials which have already been reasonably well char-
acterized from previous LOX and/or GOX. These materials should be
readily available, and should include types expected to be highly reactive,
marginal, and relatively inert from each of the categories of solids, liquids,
and semi-solids (greases). A list of materials tentatively selected is
presented in 7able 4.
TA BLE 4
TENTATIVE LIST OF TEST MA'T'ERIALS SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM
Expected Degree
Material Type
	 of Reactivity	 Material
Solid	 Reactive
	
Acetate, Nylon
Marginal	 Myla r
Inert
	 Teflon, Kel F
Liquid
	 Reactive
	
Mineral Oil
Marginal	 Versilube, FS-1265,
Aroclor 1254
Inert	 Krytox, Halocarbon 41 IV
Grease
	
Reactive
	 Hydrocarbon Grease
Marginal	 FS-1281
Ine rt	 K ryt ox
2. Verification of Test System Response Ranges
One should begin testing with each system using one of the
materials expected to be highly reactive, alor.g with the maximurn design
impact capability.
The reason for this approach is that, as stated previously, the
"effective" input stimulus is known from past experience to be quite sensitive
to the configuration of the striker pin and specimen cup holder, The magnitude
of the sensitivity, however, is not well known; hence, we have not available
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"a priori" estimate of what this affect will be in the new systems 	 On the
other hand, it is known that the difference between the design input and the
"effective" input can be large, and it is quite possible that the initial system
designs may be unable to produce reactions on even the most reactive materials.
Obviously, such a system would be of limited value for measuring relative
material reactivities; a redesign of the striker pin and specimen holder
would be in order. Thus the system evaluations can be expected to be
iterative procedures involving perhaps a series of test-redesign sequences.
3. Definition of Response Distributions
The most accurate method of defining the impact sensitivity of
a material is to subject the material to a large number of impacts at each
of several drop heights. The reaction frequencies obtained are then plotted
as an estimate of the response distribution. Such a procedure is not practi-
cal, however, for day-to-day testing; it is too costly and too slow. To
circumvent this, several "short-cut" procedures have been developed, of
which the 50-percent point test is the most accurate with a limited number
3	 of test drops. Like any other "short-cut" procedure, however, this proce-dure cannot be used with confidence without at least a general idea of the
response distribution for the material being tested. Therefore, the
development of any impact test procedure must proceed at first with the
more cumbersome reaction frequency plotting on materials thought to be
representative of the "spectrum" of materials which will eventually be
tested. The "short-cut" procedure is brought in when judgment and experience
dictate that an adequate estimate of the "spectrum" behavior has been
obtained.
4. .Selection of Test Procedures
At this point, about all that can be said about the final test proce-
dures and equipment is that both impact sensitivity and reaction intensity
will have to be taken into account. Preliminary data taken with the E & D
test system indicate that materials which normally explode in LOX tend to
burn at a considerably slower rate in GOX; this may necessitate a different
approach to intensity measurement than was used with LOX. Beyond this,
any further speculation is considered to be decidedly premature.
As noted in Section I, all system evaluation work has been
A	 postponed in order to "qualify" some of the materials being used in the
Apollo program. The test procedure chosen arbitrarily for this work
involves a 7-1/2-lb plummet dropped from 16 in. , using the second alternate
test system mentioned previously. The test samples are 1/4 in. in dram.
The pressure, rather than the drop height, is being varied, starting with
four test drops at 2000 psi. If a reaction is observed, the pressure is
lowered and four more test drops are made. A considerable amount of data
has been generated in this work However, with the statistical inadequacies
of this approach, and without a system evaluation background, it is difficult
to derive meaningful judgments of the materials from such data.
C.	 Assistance in Apollo 13 Investigation
In late April, SwRI was asked to provide assistance to Panel 8,
High Pressure Oxygen Systems Survey, MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Team.
The Panel net in Houst%,n during the week of April 27, for the purpose of
conducting a comprehensive survey of the state-of-the-art in aircraft and
commercial oxygen system design. Particular emphasis was placed on
techniques, standards, and criteria used to minimize fire and explosion
hazards. The final report on the Pa g el findings was (list ributed in May.
In addition to participation in the Panel investigations, SwRI was
asked to perform an assessment of current test techniques for determining
the fire or explosion hazards of materials exposed to liquid or gaseous
oxygen, with the purpose in mind of developing more significant materials
qualification tests. The document ensuing from this effort was distributed
in June in the form of an addendum to the final report of the Panel.
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III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It cai, be seen from the; foregoing discussions that the development of
GOX impact test is still in a very early stage. Hence, it is premature to
attempt to draw any conclusions at this time concern i ng the probability of
success of the effort. On the other hand, the small amount of data obtained
thus far is encouraging in that the more efficient test system being developed
S producing results roughly comparable with those, from the first-generation
system (the; E& D teste r).
In all candor, however, it must be concluded that the decision to post-
pone a careful evaluation of the test system in favor of immediate use of the
equipment for "qualification" tests was unwise. As shown herein, the data
from such tests can at best be of only limited usefulness, and it is felt that
the net result of this approach has been a lengthy delay in the achie=vement
of a reliable GOX impact test. It is recommended that the evaluation phase
be resumed as soon as possible.
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